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Coffee and cocoa are C6te d'Ivoire's  two most  reduction in the output of cocoa. This will avoid
important commodity exports, accounting for  iarge govemment subsidies to cocoa growers
about 50 percent of total exports.  In the 1970s,  and will increase future exports of both prod-
Cote d'Ivoire capitalized on high world prices  ucts.
and a drop in production by other competitors to
inciease revenues from these crops, but in the  One way to do this is to devalue by  10 to 15
mid-1980s the situation changed. Falling world  percent.  Alt-matively, the govemment could
prices and an appreciating currency cut into  reduce cocoa producer prices and increase
sales of Ivorian coffeee and cocoa at the same  coffee producer prices.  Although either of these
time that international supplies mounted.  Brazil-  policies would overcome short-term problems, a
ian coffee growers increased production after the  more fundamental change should be considered.
previous year's drought, and production of  Under current maicet conditions, govemment-
cocoa rose in Ghana, Malaysia, and Indonesia.  established producer prices are no match for
As several major producers backed up their  rapidly changing world markets and exchange
export efforts with aggressive erxchange  rate  rates.  Unless CBte  d'Ivoire adopts a flexible
policies, C6te d'hvoire's exporters lost their  pricing policy, the country may face continuing
competitive position.  problems in intemational competitiveness.
To offset the slump in revenues, the govem-  This paper is a product of the Intemational
ment will have to reverse this decline in com-  Commodity Marikets  Division, Intemational
petitiveness.  A study of the markets for both  Economics Department. Copies are available
these commodities under different pricing and  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
subsidy policies confirms that coffee production  Washington, DC 20433.  Plese contact Dawn
should be increased, even at the cost of some  Gustafson, room S7-044, extension 33714.
The PPR  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work  under  way  in the Bank's  Policy,  Planming,  and Research
Complex.  An objective  of the series  is to get these  fndings out  quickly,  even  if presentations  are less than  fully  polished.
The findings,  interpretations,  and  conulusions  in  these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  policy  of the Bank.
Copyright  @  1988  by the International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and DevelopnentjThe  World  BankTABLE  al  COPT  i0s
Page
I.  INTRODUCTION  ...........  .
II.  RECENT  TRENDS  IN IVORIAN  COFFEE  AND  COCOA  SECTORS...  o. oo...3
III.  MAIN  GOVERNMENT  POLICY  INSTRUMENTS  IN  THE  COFFEE
AND COCOA  SECTORS  ...........
A.  Producer  Prices.........  .... 8
B.  Subsidy  Policies..**  1**2.......
IV.  QUANTITATIVE  ANALYSIS  OF COFFEE  AND  COCOA  SUPPLY
IN COTE d'IVOIRE  ........... 1......
V.  INTERNATIONAL  ENVIRONMENT  FACING  COFFEE  AND
COCOA  SECTORS... ...
A.  Recent  Developments  in  the  Currencies  of Major
Coffee  and  Cocoa  Producing  Countries.................21
B.  World  Market  Prospects  for  Coffee  ...... 25
C.  World  Market  Prospects  for  Cocoa..  e.e..................27
VI.  SOME  SIMULATION  RESULTS  FROM  THE  COFFEE  AND  COCOA  MODELS.......29
A.  Base Case Projections.....  ....... e...  ..............  29
S.  Costs  and  Effects  of  Coffee  Sector  Policies*9***999****....34
C.  Simulations  on Recommended  Changes  in  Coffee
and Cocoa Producer Prices  38
ANNEX  A.  Effects  of  Ivorian  Production  on  World  Prices.......**....43
ANNEX  B.  Assumptions  Made  for  Construction  of  Vintage  CapitalLIST  OF  TABLES
TABLE 1:  KEY VARIABLES  OF THE IVORIAN  COFFEE SECTOR  ..................  4
TABLE 2:  KEY VARIABLES  OF THE IVORIAN  COCOA SECTOR  ...................  s
TABLE 3:  ESTIMATED  BALANCE  OF CSSPPA  AND GOVERNMENT  FOR
COFFEE;  1979/80-1987/88  ......  .......  ........  ....  .. 10
TABLE 4:  ESTIMATED BALANCE  OF  CSSPPA AND GOVERNMENT  FOR
COCOA;  1979/8O-1987/88  ................................... 11
TABLE 5:  PLANNED  AND ACTUAL STUMPED  HECTARAG  E  ...........  s  14
TABLE 6:  ANNUAL NEW PLANTINGS  OF COFFEE  AND COCOA, 1971-83  ..........  17
TABLE 7:  PRICE  ELASTICITIES  OF COCOA AND COFFEE  SUPPLY  ..............  20
TABLE 8:  REAL EXCHANGE  RATE MOVEMENTS  IN  MAJOR COFFEE AND
COCOA PRODUCING COUNTRIES  (1982-1987)  ......................  23
TABLE 9:  RESULTS  OF BASE RUNS FOR COCOA; 1988-2000  ...... I............31
TABLE 10:  RESULTS  OF BASE  RUNS FOR COFFEE;  1988-2000.................32
TABLE II:  PROJECTED  BALANCE  SHEET  FOR COCOA FOR 1988  .................. 33
TABLE 12:  COSTS  AND EFFECTS  OF COFFEE  POLICIES;  1988-2000............37
TABLE 13:  RESULTS  OF RECOMMENDED  POLICY  RUN FOR COFFEE:
1988-2000  ...................................  . *  .*..*......40
TABLE 14:  RESULTS OF  RECOMMENDED  POLICY RUN FOR COCOAS
1988-2000  .......................  41
TABLE 15:  COMPARISON  OP THE  BASE RUN AND THE  RECOMMENDED
POLICY  RUN:  1988-2000  .................................... 42I. INTRODUCTIOG
6.  Cocoa and coffee  are the two most important  export  commodities  of
C8te d'Ivoire.  Together  they accounted  for about 50X of total exports  in
recent  years.  Moreover,  the two crops  constitute  up to 401 of agricultural
GNP  and employment  for  over  one-half  of Ivorian  farmers. The  contribution  to
the Ivorian  economy  of the two  commodities  was especially  significant  during
the 1970s  when worid  prices  were very high and  when Ivorian  cocoa  production
and export quantities  increased  sharply.  However,  the situation  changed
rather suddenly in the mid-1980s when world prices of coffee and  cocoa
weakened  and as a  sharp  appreciation  of the CFAF vis-a-vis  th- 'iJS  dollar
occurred.
7.  This  decline  in  world  prices  and the  substantial  appreciation  of the
CFAF meant sharp  reductions  in government  revenues  and some  decline  in real
producer  prices  of these  two commodities. These changes  have occurred  at a
time when other major coffee and cocoa producing  countries  were adopting
aggressive  exchange rate policies.  As a  result Gote d'Ivoire has  become
relatively  less competitive  internationally  when it needed to reverse its
recent  decline  in  coffee  production.
8.  The need to increase  coffee  p.oduction  relative  to cocoa is evident
from the fact that the marginal export revenue of cocoa is only about
US$1.10/kg  while  that  of coffee  is about  US$2.20/kg. The  marginal  revenue  of
cocoa  is low  because  Cote  d'Ivoire's  present  world  market  share  is  very  large,-2-
to the  extent  that  an increase  in its  exports  would  affect  world  cocoa  prices
adversely. Another  reason  for  increasing  coffee  production  is the  possibility
that C8te d'Ivoire would not  be  able to  fill its International  Coffee
Agreement  (ICA)  quota,  which might well lead to a reduction  in its quotas.
Experience  has shown  recovery  of quota  shares  has  been  difficult.
9.  All the factors  mentioned  above  point  to a changed  situation  facing
Cate  d'Ivoire. Consequently,  its  current  policies  toward  the  two  commodities
need  examination  and  new policies  require  consideration.
10.  This paper  describes  econometric  models  built  to make projections  of
the  coffee  and cocoa  sectors  and reports  the results  of simulations  of these
models  to evaluate  changes  in pricing  and other policies. Descriptions  of
recent  trends  in  the  sectors  and  of policies  adopted  towards  them  are  followed
by quantitative  analyses  of the coffee  and cocoa supply  response  in Cate
d'Ivoire.  The supply  analysis  constitutes  the core of the  models.  Because
almost  all coffee  and cocoa  are exported,  some description  of the prospects
for  world  markets  is  given. All  these  analyses  are incorporated  in the  models
and  results  of simulations  of the  models  are  discussed.- 3  -
11.  RECENT  TREDS  IN IVORIMN  COFFEE  AND  COCOA  SECTORS
11.  As shown  in  Tables  1 and  2 co2fee  and  cocoa  production  trends  have
differed  significantly  since  the  early  1960..  Coffee  production  increased  by
about  2.8%  p.a.  during  the  1960s,  stagnated  in  the  1970s  and  has  shown  some
decliae  since  1980. Cocoa  production,  on  the  other  hand, has  increased  very
strongly  since  the  early  1960s--at  an  average  rate  of  7.5%  p.a.
12.  Two  factors  are  responsible  for  the  relatively  high  production  growth
of  cocoa  compared  with  coffee--movements  in  relative  prices  and  inter-regional
migration.  As  shown  in  Tables  1  and  2,  coffee  producer  prices  in  the  1960s
and  early  1970.  were  about  25%  higher  than  those  for  cocoa.  But  from  the  late
1970s  onwards,  cocoa  producer  prices  increased  substantially  relative  to
coffee  prices.  This  change  in  relative  prices,  as  the  analysis  in  the  section
below  shows,  has  had  an important  impact  on  new  plantings  of the  two  crops.
Available  data  indicate  that  new  plantings  of cocoa  have  increased  sharply
compared  with  those  for  coffee  since  the  mid-1970s.
13.  The  second  factor  contributing  to  large  increases  in  cocoa  production
was  the  migration  of  Baules  from  the  Central  Region.  In  the  early  1970s,  as
the  Central  Region  became  drier,  many  Eaules  who grew  cocoa  there  started
migrating  to  the  Center  West,  West,  and  Southwest  Regions.  The  construction
of  Kousso  Dam  in  the  early  1970s  accelerated  this  migration.  The  government
also  aided  the  migration  by  facilitating  the  Baules'  acquisition  of  land  in-4-
TABLE  1: KEY  VARIABLES  OF  THE  IVORIAN  COFFEE  SECTOR
CROP  NOMINAL  PROOtCER  REAL  PROOUCER
YEAR  PRODUCTION  'RTS  PRICE  PRICE
--  -------- o  HOINT)---  - _  __(CFAF/kg)  (1985  CFAF/kg)
1961/62  96.6  159.5
1962/63  188.4  157.3
1963/64  256.8  214.1  85.0  467.5
1964/65  200.40  161.3  90.0  481.9
1965/66  260.4  176.5  75.0  365.4
1966/67  120.6  166.8  90.0  452.5
1967/68  282.6  196.9  90.0  429.1
1968/69  199.s  176.1  90.0  415.8
1969n70  264.6  187.9  95.0  399.7
1970n71  240.0  202.1  105.0  445.3
1971/2  272.4  227.9  105.0  443.6
1972/n3  240.6  216.5  105.0  400.8
1973/n4  262.2  268.0  120.0  389.3
1974/n5  269.4  213.5  150.0  436.4
1975/n6  316.2  332.3  150.0  389.3
1976/77  292.2  276.4  180.0  366.8
1977/n8  187.2  229.1  250.0  450.8
1978/n9  284.4  279.6  250.0  386.1
1979/80  238.2  196.6  283.0  381.7
1980/81  365.4  221.6  283.0  350.9
1981/82  249.6  295.6  283.0  326.7
1982/83  270.6  252.2  283.0  308.6
1983/84  85.2  255.8  330.0  344.7
1984/85  276.6  231.4  358.0  368.0
1985/86  280.2  257.3  377.0  377.0
1986/87  230.4  199.4  377.0
Sources: Production  and  Exports  From  USDA,  Foreign  Agricultural  Circular.  Coffee,
August  1987.  Nominal  and  real  producer  prices  from  CDGT  (Control  et  Directlon  des
Grands  Trauaux).  The  deflator  used  Is  the  CPI  for  Africans  In  Abidjan.- 5  -
TABLE  2:  KEY  VARIABLES  OF  THE  IVORIAN  COCOA  SECTOR
CROP  ^COOA  BEAN  PRODUCT  TOTAL  BEAN  NOMINAL  PRODUCER  REAL  PROMDUCER
YEAR  PRODUCTION  EXPORTS  EXPORTS EQUIVALENT  EXPORTS  PRICE  PRICE
--------------------  - (OOOIT)---  -------  (CFAF/kg)  (1985  CFAF/kg)
1961/62  r.o
1962/63  103.0
1963/64  99.0  70.0  385.0
1964/65  148.0  0.7  70.0  374.8
1965/66  113.0  135.0  11.6  146.6  55.0  282.7
1966/67  150.0  95.0  18.3  113.3  70.0  351.9
1967/68  147.0  128.0  23.7  151.7  70.0  333.9
1968/69  145.0  115.0  30.2  145.2  70.0  323.4
1969/70  181.0  114.0  28.9  142.9  80.0  336.6
1970/71  180.0  145.0  36.6  181.6  8S.0  360.5
1971/72  226.0  143.0  34.5  177.5  8S.0  359.3
1972/73  181.0  188.0  38.7  226.7  85.0  324.5
1973/74  209.0  ?49.0  31.1  180.1  110.0  356.9
1974/75  242.0  173.0  35.1  208.1  175.0  509.2
1975/76  231.0  189.0  49.7  238.7  175.0  454.1
1976/77  230.0  173.0  48.4  226.4  180.0  366.8
1977/78  304.0  190.0  40.1  230.1  250.0  450.8
1978/79  318.0  239.0  56.2  295.2  250.0  386.1
1979/80  398.0  260.0  51.1  311.1  300.0  404.9
1980/81  417.0  321.0  51.2  372.2  300.0  372.0
1981/82  465.0  353.0  69.0  422.0  300.0  346.4
1982/83  360.0  393.0  S2.3  455.3  300.0  327.1
1983/84  411.0  286.0  64.9  350.9  350.0  365.6
1984/85  565.0  449.0  78.5  527.5  375.0  385.5
1985/86  S6O.0  445.0  94.3  539.3  400.0  4000.
1986/87  400.0
Sources:  Production  dote  from  Gill  and  Duffus.  Nominal  and  reel  prices  from  C-GT  (the  deflator  used  Is
the  CPI for  Africans  In  Abidjan).  Beon  and  product  exports  from  FAO.the  western  regions. As Baules  were traditionally  cocoa  growers,  they spread
cocoa  planting  techniques  to farmers  in  the  westerLa  regions.  1/
14.  Export  trends  of the  two  commodities  basically  reflect  the  production
trends.  Export  values,  however,  have fluctuated  with world prices.  World
coffee  prices  were high in the second  half of the 1970s,  due mainly  to the
reduction  in Brazil's  production  following  a  severe frost in 1975.  But
Brazil's  production  recovered  by the early 1980s and world coffee prices
declined.  The  International  Coffee  Agreement  has succeeded  in keeping  nominal
US$  prices  from  declining  since  1981;  they  have,  however,  continued  to  decline
in real terms--except  for a  short period in 1986 following  a  drought in
Brazil.
15.  World  cocoa  prices  were  high  during  most  of the  1970s  largely  because
production in Ghana and  Nigeria declined.  But  since the  early  1980s
production  in  Ghana  has  recovered  and  production  in  Malaysia  and  C6te  d'Ivoire
has increased,  putting  nominal  and real world cocoa prices under downward
pressure.
16.  The sharp  decline  in government  revenue  from the two commodities  is
an important  recent  development.  This has  been  most strongly  felt  in 1987  as
world prices of coffee  and cocoa fell and as the CFAF appreciated  sharply
against the US dollar.  The problem is especially  serious for the cocoa
1/  Coffee  and  cocoa  production  practices  by  the  various  tribes  have  been
extensively  studied  in  the  Center  West  Region  Project.- 7  -
sector.  Rather  than  being  a source  of  significant  government  revenue,  it  is
estimated  that  the  cocoa  sector  will  receive  direct  government  payments  of
about  CPAF20/kg  in  1987/88  1/  (See  table  4).
17.  The government  recognizes  2he relative  weakness  of the coffee
sector.  To  strengthen  the  coffee  sector  and  reduce  cocoa  production  growth,
in  1979  the  government,  through  SATMACI  (Societe  d'Assistance  Technique  et  de
la Moderni-ation  de Agriculture  en C8te  d'Ivoire),  started  a progr--.  o
encourage  stumping  of old  coffee  trees  and  in  1984  halted  a  program  designed
to encourage  iew  plantings  of  cocoa. A program  to  encourage  replanting  of
coffee  trees  is  under  consideration.
1/ In  this  paper  crop  years  such  as  "1985/86"  will  be  referred  to  as  "1985"
unless  specified  otherwise.111.  HAIN  COVnERNEnT  POLICY INSTRUIENTS  IN THE COFFEE  AND  COCOA  SECTORS
18.  There are basically  two instruments  used by the government  to
influence  behavior  in  the  coffee  and  cocoa  sectors--setting  of  producer  prices
and subsidies.  Government  policies  in these  two  areas  have  had important
effects  and  thus  they  will  be  examined  here  in  some  detail.
A. Producer  Pricez
19.  In  September  of each  year,  just  before  the  harvesting  season,  the
government  announces  producer  prices  for  coffee  and cocoa.  The producer
prices  appear  to  be  decided  irrespective  of  the  level  of  world  prices.  They
are determined  by a Presidential  decree  to "reflect  production  cost"  and
"equal  renumeration  for  all  crops". Under  this  policy  the  ratio  of  official
producer  prices  for coffee  and cocoa  has been  constant  since  the 1976/77
season. However,  in the 1979/80  season  coffee  began  to be purchased  as
cherries  1/ rather  than  as green  beans;  therefore,  some  decline  in coffee
producer  prices  relative  to  cocoa  occurred  in  that  season.
20.  The  government  not  only  determines  producer  prices  but  also  domestic
and  external  marketing  and  transportation  costs.  Each  year  the  CSSPPA  (Caisse
de Stabilization  et de Soutien  des Prix  des Produits  Agricoles)  publishes
1/ Outer  skin,  pulp  and  silverskin  need  to  be  removed  to  convert  a  cherry  to
a  green  bean."Differentiels"  for coffea  and cocoa which specify in detail what private
traders can  charge the  CSSPPA as  domestic and  external marketing and
transportation  costs.  Export tax ("Droit  Unique  de Sortie"  for cocoa and
"Dou_ne"  for coffe.e)  is included  as an item in the "Differentiel"  tables.
Surpluses  or losses  arising from the differences  between the actual  world
prices and  the f.o.b. or c.i.lf.  prices given in the "Differentiel"  are
retained  by the  CSSPPA.
21.  The  unchanging  coffee  and cocoa  price  elationship  has resulted  in a
large increase  in cocoa production  and some  decline  i.n  coffee  production  in
the last 10 years.  Past production  trends and production  cost analysis
strongly  suggest  that the  present  pricing  policy  does  not  "reflect  production
costs" and "equal renumeration  for all  crops" for the two crops.  The
government  is aware  of the  production  trends  of recent  years  but  has  found  it
difficult  to change  the  price  relationship. Instead,  it has  been inclined  to
adopt  subsidy  policies  in  favor  of coffee.
22.  The  existing  pricing  policy  created nother  major  problem  in the  1987
season.  As tables  3 and 4 show, the CSSPPA  is expected  to incur a large
deficit  in  the  current  season  due  to the  decline  in  world  cocoa  prices  and  the
sharp  appreciation  of the CPAF.  Coffee is expected  to show some surplus,
thanks  to the  recent  recovery  in  world  coffee  prices.TABLE  3: ESTIMATED  BALANCE  OF  CSSPPA  AND  GOVERENT FOR  COFFEE;  1979/0-b967/88
1979/80  1960/81  1981/82  1962/83  1983/84  1964/85  1965/86  1966/87  1967/88
------ (CfFAF/6)  --
PRIUCR  PRICE  (cherry)  150.0  15  .0  150.0  150.0  175.0  190.0  200.0  200.0  200.0
LOCAL  COLLECTION,
STORAGE  & HANDLING  COST  10.6  11.7  13.5  16.3  16.1  16.6  17.8  14.8  14.8
PRICE  (GEEN  EQUIVALENT)  303.0  305.1  306.5  313.8  360.6  389.6  410.9  405.4  405.4
WA(ETING,  PROCESSING,
TRANSPORTATION  & STORAGE  COST  58.0  64.1  70.6  74.2  79.7  83.7  68.3  73.5  73.5
EXPORT  TAX  57.5  57.5  57.5  57.5  80.5  60.5  80.5  100.5  100.5
EXPFrWER'S  PROFIT  2.4  2.6  2.7  2.7  2.9  2.9  3.2  3.0  3.0
PORT  HANDLINB  COST  2.3  2.7  2.7  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.7  3.8  3.8
F.03.9  VALUE  423.2  432.0  442.0  451.5  527.0  560.2  566.6  586.1  566.1
FREIGHT  & INSURANCE  56.0  57.0  56.0  58.0  60.0  69.9  63.5  63.5  63.5
C.  IF. VALUE  479.2  489.0  500.0  509.5  5T.0  630.1  650.1  649.6  649.6
COST  HORS  BARENE  /a  50.0  50.0  50.0  50.0  55.1  68.0  58.2  56.7  58.7
TOTAL  COST  TO  CSSPPA  529.2  539.0  550.0  5S9.5  642.1  696.1  706.3  708.3  706.3
ACTUAL  C.I.F.  VALWE  834.9  678.1  693.0  735.2  965.5  1,105.3 1,101.4  743.6  710.5  lb
BALANCE  OF  CSSPPA  305,7  139.1  143.0  175.7  343.4  407.2  393.1  35.3  2.2
BALANCE  OF  GOVESENT  363.2  196.6  200.5  233.2  423.9  487.7  473.6  135.8  102.7
/a  Includes  cost  for  storage, financing,  and  payments  to  processors  for  capacity  underutIlIzatlon.
/b Estimnted  by Internatlonal  Comodity  Nmrkb  t  Division.4:
1979/80  1960/81  1981/82  196243  196344  196445  196586  19E6J87  196748
(CFWAF)
PROUCER  PRICE  300.0  300.0  300.0  300.0  350.0  375.0  400.0  400.0  400.0
LOCAL  COLLECTION  (cherry)
STORAE  & HANDLING  COST  15.4  17.0  19.2  20.9  23.2  24.1  25.1  25.1  25.0
MARETIN,  PROCESSING
TRANRTATION & STORAGE  COST  30.6  33.0  37.0  40.6  U.5  44.7  51.2  51.7  53.1
EXPORT  TAX  50.6  50.6  50.6  50.6  80.5  80.S  80.5  100.5  100.5
EXPRTER'S  PROFIT  2.1  2.3  2.4  3.3  3.3  3.3  2.9  2.5  3.3
PORT  HANDLIN  COST  2.3  2.7  2.7  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.5  3.08  3.5
F.O.B.  VALUE  401.0  405.6  411.9  418.9  504.8  530.9  563.2  563.6  584.4
FREIGHT  & INSU<ANCE  44.0  49.0  51.0  51.0  56.1  66.6  76.0  73.7  73.7
C.I.F.  VALUE  445.0  454.6  462.9  469.9  562.9  597.7  639.2  657.3  659.1
COST  HORS  ORE  /a  35.0  35.0  35.0  35.0  39.9  42.7  33.3  33.3  32.3
TOTAL  COST  TO  CSSPPA  480.0  469.6  497.9  504.9  602.6  640.4  672.5  690.6  691.4
ACTUAL  C.I.F.  VALIE  627.6  510.0  595.0  651.4  876.5  992.9  864.3  705.9  571.5 Ab
ALAMCE  OF CSSWPA  147.6  20.4  97.1  146.5  273.7  352.5  191.6  15.3  -119.9
BALANCE  OF COVEMENT  198.2  71.0  147.7  197.1  354.2  433.0  272.3  115.8  -19.4
/a  The export  tax  has ben  raised  from 23%  of  the  *valeur  mercurial*"  for  the  crops  190041-196546  to  25.125%  for  the
196687 crop.
Ab  EstImated  by  Intornational  Comodity  Nrlket  D vision.
S  )urce:  CSSPPAe- 12 -
23.  An obvious  way to reduce  the CSSPPA  deficit  on cocoa is to reduce
cocoa  producer  prices.  An argument  against  this policy  is that such action
would defeat  the purpose  of the CSSPPA  price stabilization  operation.  The
CSSPPA should, it could be argued, offset the deficits arising from an
unfavorable  world  market situation by  using  the  large  surplus it  has
accumulated  in  recent  years  when  the  world  market  was  much  more favorable.
B.  Subsidy  Policies
24.  In C8te  d'Ivoire  extension  services  and subsidy  programs  for  the two
sectors  are carried  out by SATMACI  and agronomic  research  is done by IRCC
(Coffee  and Cocoa Research  Institute). Communications  are well established
between  the two institutions  and research  results  are passed  from IRCC to
SATMACI  and,  in turn,  to growers.
25.  A subsidy program  for cocoa was in effect between  1971 and 1983.
During  this  period,  SATMACI  distributed  1,500  plastic  bags  (to  hold seedlings)
and 50 hybrid  cocoa seeds  per hectare,  as well as subsidized  fertilizer  and
insecticides.  Subsidized  credits  were also  given  to growers  to purchase  power
insecticide  sprayers  (atomiseur)  and  manual  insecticide  and  fungicide  sprayers
(pulverisateur). This program was stopped after 1983 as the government
considered  that  cocoa  production  had  reached  its  target.
26.  A subsidy  program  for  coffee  also started  in 1971.  It consisted  of
free  distribution  of 1,500  plastic  bags (sachets)  and 1,750  improved  variety
seedlings  per hectare.  This program continues,  although there was  some- 13  -
reduction  during the period 1983-1986  when the government  feared a  large
accumulation  of stocks  due to the ICA quotas.  During  this period,  several
seedling  nurseries  were closed  down.  This move has caused  some shortages  of
seedlings  since  1983.
27.  A subsidy  program  on stumping  (recepage)  began  in 1979/80. Stumping
is a coffee  tree rejuvenation  technique  in which all or some of the large
shoots  are  ut.  Stumping  usually  reduces  the yield  of a tree for a year or
two,  but after  the  third  year  yield  recovers  to the level  of young  trees. In
the  first year,  20,000 CFAF/ha worth  of  materials (such as  saws and
fertilizer)  and cash of 20,000  CFAF/ha  are given  to growers.  In the second
year,  another  20,000  CFAF/ha  in  cash  is given. "Objective"  and  actual  stumped
areas  under the program  since  1980/81  are given in Table  5. From 1980/81  to
1984/85  the  actual  stumped  area  fell  well below  the  objectives  of the  program.
In the last two years the area stumped has increased  sharply.  SATMACI
extension  officers  consider  that  recent  increases  in the  stumped  area result
from  growers'  appreciation  of the  beneficial  effects  of stumping.
28.  The  effect of  stumping on yield is uncertain.  Although in a
controlled  research  station  situation  stumping  will  increase  yield
substantially,  good husbandry,  including  weeding  and  fertilizer  applications,
is necessary for stumping  to be effective.  Under the extension  program,
subsidies  are given for stumping  but not  to encourage better husbandry.
Higher  coffee  producer  prices  may be necessary  for this program  to be more
effective.- 14  -
Table  5:  PLANNED  AND  ACTUAL  STUMPED  HECTARACE
(Hectares)
Years  Objective  Actual
1980/81  12,500  7,176
1981/32  13,000  7,133
1982/83  17,000  8,860
1983/84  20,000  4,881
1984!85  20,000  7,698
1985;86  17,200  12,135
1986/87  15,000  16,890
Source: SATMACI.
29.  There is another  important  factor  to be taken  into account if the
stumping  subsidy  program  is to be used  as one  of the  major  policy  instruments
to itIcrease  coffee  production. To be effective  stumping  must be carried  out
every 5 to 6 years.  Thus, the stumping  program  will not contribute  to net
accvmulated  stumped  area after  5  or  6  years  if the  annual  stumping  hectarage
stays at  the same level.  To clarify this point, let's assume that the
stumping  program  succeeds  in making  growers  stump  15,000  ha a year.  After
five  years,  there  will  be total  stumped  area  of 75,000  ha.  But from  the  sixth
year  onward,  the  15,000  ha which  were stumped  in the  first  year  will be ready
for stumping  again.  So in net terms,  the program  cannot  increase  the total
stumped area after the  fifth year unless the annual stumping rate  is
increased.
30.  A subsidy  program  for uprooting  old coffee  trees  and planting  new
ones is currently  under consideration.  Through this program an as yet
I- 15  -
undetermined  sum of cash will be paid to farmers  who uproot old trees and
plant new ones.  This program  will also increase  coffee  production  using
incentives  other than producer  prices.  Evaluation  of this program  and the
stumping  program  will  be  made in  Section  VI using  the  supply  models.
31.  This brief review of recent subsidy  programs  reveals a  st.cruous
effort  by the  government  in  the last  few  years  to encourage  coffee  production
relative  to cocoa production.  These programs  are being undertaken  for two
reasons;  t  '  political  difficulty  of changing  the  relationship  between  coffee
and  cocoa  prices  and  the  strains  on the  government  budget.- 16  -
IV.  QUW  TTITVIl  ALYSIS  OF COFFEE  AND  COCOA  SUPPLY  IN  CM  d'IIRE
32.  In  order  to analyze  coffee  and  cocoa  supply  response  quantitatively,
the vintage capital approach was used. 1/  The vintage capital approach
requires  annual  data  on  new plantings,  and  the  yield  curve  and  the  death  rates
of trees by age group.  In addition,  a distinction  has to be made between
high-yielding  and  traditional  varieties. Assumptions  made  in constructing  the
vintage  matrices  are given in Annex  B.  As discuised  there,  the effects  of
bush fires in 1983 and the estimated  effects of stumping  are taken into
account.
33.  Data  on  new  plantings,  by  year, are  kept by  the Ministry of
Agriculture. However,  these  data  cover  only the  area  planted  by the  improved
coffee  seedlings  and hybrid  cocoa seeds distributed  by SATMACI.  The only
source  available for total annual coffee and cocoa new plantings  is the
agricultural  surveys  conducted  by MINAGREP  DSREA  in 1974,  1979  and 1983. New
planting  areas  estimated  from  the  sutfeys  are  given  in  Table  6.
34.  An obvious  shortcoming  of the  new planting  data  given  in Table  6 is
that  no data  on total  plantings  after  1983  are  available. This  not  only  makes
it difficult  to evaluate  recent  new planting  developments,  but also excludes
any  possibility  of  evaluating  the  impact  of cocoa  subsidies  in  effect  between
1/  See  for  details  Akiyama,  T. and  P.  Trivedi,  "A  New  Global  Tea  Model",
World  Bank  Staff  Commodity  Working  Paper  No.  17,  1987.- 17  -
TABLE  6:  ANNUAL  NEW  PLANTINGS  OF COFFEE  AND  COCOA,  1971-43
COFFEE  COCOA
CROP  IWROVED  SHARE  OF  SHARE  OF  COFFEE  AND
YEAR  TOTAL  COFFEE  IWPROVED  OOFFEE  TOTAL  HYBRID  HYBRID  COCOA
-KA  ------  - - -4--  -----  -A-  …  --- %-  -000  HA--
1971  67,100.0  1,073.0  2,0  35,300.0  2,513.0  7.0  102.4
1972  44,100.0  2,656.0  6.0  55,600,0  6,583.0  12.0  99.7
1973  31,800.0  7,395,0  23.0  42,900.0  7,959.0  19.0  74.7
1974  40,400.0  7,315.0  18.0  57,400.0  10,226.0  18.0  97.8
1975  37,500.0  9,335  0  25.0  64,600.0  13,762.0  21.0  102.1
1976  37,900.0  9,027.0  24.0  51,700.0  16,129.0  31.0  89.6
1977  18,300.0  10,239.0  56.0  82,400.0  20,741.0  25.0  100.7
1978  27,400.0  10,736.0  39.0  65,700.0  22,207.0  34.0  93.1
1979  31,000.0  10,104.0  33.0  89,600.0  24,254.0  27.0  120.6
1960  23,000.0  9,956.0  43.0  73,000.0  23,243.0  32.0  96.0
11  23,600.0  11,066.0  47.0  74,700.0  19,703.0  26.0  96.3
1962  18,000.0  8,073.0  45.0  63,200.0  6,744.0  11.0  81.2
1963  (15,000.0)  6,086.0  (41.0)  (50,000.0)  6,186.0  12.0  (65.0)
1964  4,474.0  3,351.0
1965  5,745.0  7,823.0
1966  2,539.0  13,033.0
1967  6,285.0
*TOTAL 415,100.0  103,061.0  25.0  806,100.0  180,250.0  22.0  1,221.2
*  Total  for  1971-83.
SOURCE: SATHWCI  and  HINAA3MF  OSREA  (MInister,  de I  'Agrlculture  et  des  Eaux  at  Forets,  Dlrectlon  ds
Statistiques  et  des  Enquetes  Agricoles).- 18 -
1971  and  1983. The  effects  of subsidies  on new  cocoa  plantings  may  not  be
significant,  however;  the subsidies  were giveti  only to those growers who
received  SATMACI  extension  services,  which  included  planting  hybrid  seeds. As
Table 6 shows,  the share  of growers  who have planted hybrid varieties  is
relatively  small.
35.  Another  possible  problem  with the  data in  Table  6 is with  regard o
the  new  planting  data  on coffee. Several  SATMACI  extension  officers  consulted
consider  the  total  annual  plantings  data  to be overestimated,  especially  after
1978. They  consider  most  of the  coffee  new  plantings  in recent  years  to be of
the improved  variety  distributed  by SATMACI.  Unfortunately,  unless  another
survey  is  conducted,  verification  of these  claims  is impossible.
36.  Regression  analysis  was carried out to estimate  the effects of
producer  prices  on new plantings,  under  the  assumption  that  new plantings  of
both coffee and cocoa are influenced  by the producer  prices of the two
commodities. The regression  analysis  proved  rather  inconclusive  because  for
much  of the  period  for  which  data  are avaitible  the  ratio  of  coffee  and  cocoa
producer  prices  was  constant. However,  several  regression  runs  indicated  that
Ivorian  farmers'  coffee  and cocoa  new plantings  are very sensitive  to real
prices. The  best  estimates  for  coffee  new  plantings  are  4.0 for  the  own-price- 19  -
elasticity  and  -1.5  for  the  cross-price  elasticity.  For  cocoa  they  were  1.9
and  -0.6.  1/
37.  Construction  of the vintage  capital  matrices  provide  potential
production  capacities. The estimated  production  capacity  values  can be
regressed  against  actual  production  values,  together  with other  relevant
variables,  to see  if the  data  and  assumptions  used  to  calculate  production
capacity  values  are  correct. The regression  results  show  the  coefficients
relating  production  potential  to actual  production  to be 1.02  and  0.99  for
cocoa  and coffee,  respectively.  These  coefficients  are statistically  very
significant.  The  results  indicate  that  the  calculated  production  potential  of
the  two  commodities  follcw  actual  production  very  closely,  which  suggests  that
the  assumptions  made  in c.lculating  production  potential  are not far from
reality.
38.  The statistical  analysis  did not show  much significance  on the
short-term  price  elasticities.  They  are  assumed  here  to  be  0.22  for  the  own-
price  elasticities  of  both  commodities  2/  and  0.08  for  cocoa  prices  on  coffee
1/  The  estimated  cross-price  elasticities  are  in  accordance  with  the  cross-
price  symmetry  condition  which,  with  a  little  modification,  states  that
the  ratio  of  two  cross-price  elasticities  should  be  in  reverse  proportion
to  the  ratio  of  the  produced  values  of  two  commodities.  (See  p.  33,  Hal
R.  Varian  Microeconomic  Analysis,  W.W.  Norton  & Co.  Inc.,  1978.
2/  Although  not  significant  statistically,  coffee's  estimated  own-price
elasticities  ranged  between  0.16  and  0.28.- 20 -
production  and  0.04  for  coffee  prices  on cocoa  production.  1/
39.  As discussed  by  Akiyama  and  Trivedi,  2/  long-term  price  elasticities
of supply  change  with time.  Own- and  cross-price  elasticities  of supply  for
coffee  and cocoa  are given in Table  7.  These  elasticities  are derived  from
the  model  simulations.
Table  7:  PRICE  ELASTICITIES  OF COCOA  AND  COFFEE  SUPPLY
Cocoa  Coffee
own  Cross  Own  Cross
Short-Term  (Immediate)  0.22  0.04  0.22  0.08
Medium-Term  (5  years)  0.27  0.06  0.32  0.12
Long-Term  (10  years)  0.60  0.17  1.10  0.40
Source: IECCM.
1/  Coffee's  cross-price  elasticity  was  estimated  to  be 0.08. Using  the
cross-price  symmetry  conditiov  (described  earlier)  cocoa's  cross-price
elasticity  is  assumed  to  be 0.04.
2/  Ibid.- 21  -
V.  IITIRNATIOIAL IStVIBROMT FACING  COFFEE  AND  COCOA  SRCTORS
40.  Because most of  the coffee and cocoa produced in C8te d'Ivoire  is
exported, Ivorian policies must take into account the international markets
for coffee and cocoa.  Two topics are considered here--recent developments in
the currencies of major coffee  and cocoa producing countries and prospects for
the world coffee and cocoa markets.  These topics are discussed with specific
reference to their interest  for C6te d'Ivoire.
A.  Recent Developments in the Currencies of Major Coffee and Cocoa
Producing Countries
41.  Prices of both coffee and cocoa declined sheply  in  1987 compared
with levels that prevailed in 1985 and 1986.  Ceteris paribus, this decline
should lead to lower producer prices in coffee and cocoa producing countries
and, in turn, to reduced world production.  However, such relationships will
exist only when other variables such as exchange rates, export tax rates and
productivity do not change.  An important development among major coffee and
cocoa producing countries in the last few years has been the variations in
exchange rates.
42.  The impact  of exchange rate changes on supply competitiveness  is well
known; for example, there are several studies linking the decline of cocoa
production  in  Ghana  to  its  over-valued  currency.  The  recent  sharp
appreciation of  the  CFAF  vis-a-vis  the US  doliar would  not  have  reduced- 22  -
Ivorian relative competitiveness  in  producing coffee and  cocoa  if  the
currencies  of other  major producing  countries  had also appreciated.  Table 8
shows real exchange rate movements in  selected  major  coffee and  cocoa
producing  countries.  As the table shows,  appreciation  of the CFAF has been
substantial  in real terms--some  35X since  1982.  However,  the  currencies  of
other  major  coffee  and  cocoa  producing  countries  have not  appreciated  as much
as  the  CFAF.  In  fact,  Brazilian,  Colombian, Indo:  tsian and  Ghanaian
currencies  have depreciated  substantially  vis-a-vis  the  US dollar  in the  last
five  years.
43.  The rel.-.ve  movements  of real  exchange  rates  among  major  coffee  and
cocoa  producing c.untries have  impcrtrdL implications  for  world market
prospects.  In  economic terms, reaI  depreciation  of  these  currencies
translates  to a significant  shift  of world supply  curves  to the  right  in the
price-supply  diagram.  In other  words,  with such currency  devaluation,  world
coffee  and cocoa supplies  can be increasing  in spite  of a decline  in world
prices expressed in  US  dollars.  If these countries with depreciating
currencies  maintain  their  real  exchange  rates  at current  levels  or continue  to
devalue,  world coffee  and cocoa prices  are likely  to stay at considerably
lower  levels  in real  terms  than  in  the  1970s.
44.  To avoid  losing  its  competitiveness  in  the  long  run,  a country  in  the
r.osition  of C8te d'Ivoire  can react  to the  situation  by one  or a combination
of two  measures--devaluation  or productivity  increases. However,  devaluation
alone  cannot  be thought  of as an instrument  which  can be used indefinitely
to  maintain  competitiveness.  If  devaluation  is ruled out  because of C6te- 23  -
TABLE 8:  REAL EXCIiAWE RATE MOVEMENTS  IN  MAJOR  COFFEE  AND
COCOA  PRODUCING  CCUNTRIES  a/
(1982-  1987)
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
9RA2 I L
Nominbl  exchange  rate  0.18  0.58  1.85  6.20  13.63  32.29
Consumer  price  index  bl  407.00  984.00  2,924.00  9,556.00  23,436.00  76,334.00
Real  exchange  rate  100.00  75.42  69.98  68.17  76.07  65.99
COLOMBI  A
Nominal  exchange  rate  64.08  78.85  100.82  142.13  194.26  237.18
Consumer  price  Index  158.80  190.20  220.80  273.90  325.70  406.40
Real  exchange  rate  100.00  97.34  88.37  77.76  67.66  69.14
COSTA  RICA
Nominal  exchange  rate  37.41  41.09  44.53  50.45  55.99  61.26
Consumer  price  index  260.60  345.60  386.90  445.10  497.80  581.80
Real exchange  rate  100.00  120.72  124.71  126.63  127.63  136.32
EL  SALVADOR  /c
Nominal  exchange  rate  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  5.0  5.0
Consumer  price  Index  128.30  145.30  162.10  198.20  261.60  330.00
Real  exchange  rate  100.00  113.25  126.34  154.48  101.95  128.60
GWATAMALA
Nominal  exchange  rate  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.88  2.50
Consumer  price  index  111.80  116.80  120.80  143.40  196.40  220.10
Real  exchange  rate  100.00  104.47  108.05  128.26  93.69  78.75
I NOONES  IA
Nominal  exchange  rate  661.40  909.30  1,025.90  1,110.60  1,282.60  1,642.09
Ccnsumer  price  Index  112.20  122.90  137.40  151.70  158.90  183.50
Real  exchange rate  100.00  79.67  78.95  80.52  73.03  65.88
MALAYSIA
Ncninal  exchange  rate  2.34  2.32  2.34  2.48  2.58  2.52
Consumer  price  index  116.10  120.40  125.10  125.50  126.40  127.90
Real  exchange  rate  100.00  104.33  107.37  101.67  98.50  101.95
CAMEROON
Nominal  exchange  rate  328.16  381.06  436.26  449.26  346.38  304.81
Consumer  price  index  125.40  146.30  162.90  165.00  ;70.02  183.03
Real  exchange  rate  100.00  100.61  97.70  96.25  128.80  139.30- 24  -
TABLE  8:  REAL  EXCHAWGE  RATE  MOVEMENTS  IN MAJOR  COFFEE  AND
COCOA  PROOUCING  COUNTRIES  continued...
(1982  - 1987)
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
COTE  D0  1I VORE
Nominal exchange rate  328.61  381.06  436.96  449.26  346.30  304.81
Consumer  price  index  116.80  123.70  129.00  131.40  140.10  147.05
Real  exchange rate  100.00  91.33  83.06  82.29  113.82  134.74
GHANA
Nominal  exchange rate  2.75  3.45  35.34  54.05  89.29  133.33
Consumer price  Index  264.80  590.10  824.10  909.10  1,132.40  1,544.03
Real  exchange rate  100.00  177.63  24.22  17.47  13.17  12.04
KENYA
Nominal  exchange rate  10.92  13.31  14.41  16.43  16.23  16.30
Consumer  price  Index  134.70  150.20  165.40  187.00  194.40  202.00
Real  exchange rate  100.00  91.49  93.04  92.28  97.14  100.48
NIGERIA
Nominal exchange rate  0.67  0.72  0.76  0.89  1.35  3.93
Consumer  price  index  130.10  160.30  223.80  236.10  248.80  249.01
Real  exchange rate  100.00  114.66  151.65  136.62  94.61  32.46
UGANDA
Nominal exchange rate  94.05  153.86  359.70  672.02  1,400.00  4,284.10
Consumer  price  index  200.30  248.30  343.30  797.80  2,217.80  7,498.80
Real  exchange rate  100.00  75.78  44.81  55.88  74.38  81.98
/a  Formula used to  calculate  real  exchange rate  Is:
REXt a  (NEX82ANEXt)  *  (Ult182)
Where: REXt  = Real  Exchange Rate  In  year  t
NEXt  *  Nominal Exchange Rate  In  year  t
NEX 82 a  Nominal  Exchange Rate  In  1982
CPIt  C  Consumer  Price  Index  In  year  t
CP182  Consumer  Price Index  In  year  1982
/b  CPI  is  with  1980 as  1oo except  for  Uganda  which  is  with  April  1981 as  100.
Source:  lIW,  International  Financial  Statistics.- 25 -
d'Ivoire's  participation  in  the  CFA  zone,  ongoing  measures  aimed  at increasing
productivity  become  indispensable  for  C8te  d'Ivoire  if it  is to regain  or even
maintain  its  competitiveness.
B.  World  Market  Prospects  for  Coffee
45.  World  market  prospects  for  coffee  depend  to an extent  on the  fate  of
the International  Coffee  Agreement  (ICA).  The current  ICA, with its  export
quota  regime,  is expected  to be in force  until  September  1989.  Although  the
quotas  were lifted  for about 20 months  between  February  1986 and September
1987,  because  of the  boom in prices,  the  agreement's  renegotiated  quotas  are
likely  to be effective  throughout  the remainder  of the  agreement. At present
it is difficult  to project  whether  a new agreement  will come into  force  from
October  1989.  There are several  issues  which  have arisen  between  producers
and  consumers  which  have remained  unsettled  for  several  years  and  which  could
lead  to  difficulties  in the  renegotiations.
46.  Even if the ICA quota system continues,  the price prospects  for
coffee  are not bright  because  of slow demand  growth  and  productivity  growth.
Because  productivity  growth is expected  to be high in Brazil,  Colombia  and
Indonesia,  production  growth  in  these  countries  should  be sufficient  to meet- 26
small  increases  in  global  quotas,  even  at low  real  world  prices.  1/  World  net
imports  are expected  to increase  by only  1.0 to 1.5%  p.a.  between  now  and the
year 2000.  An important  reason for this expected  slow growth is the low
population  growth  in the industrial  countries  where  over 90% of world  coffee
is consumed.  In real terms,  coffee  prices  are expected  to remain  near the
current  historically  low  levels  through  2000.
47.  If the  Coffee  Agreement  were suspended,  world  coffee  prices  over the
next five years could  be expected  to average  between  15 and 30% lower than
would be the case in the presence  of the Agreement  and with quotas  near
present  levels.  If the  current  exchange  rate relationships  between  coffee-
producing  countries  continue,  many other major coffee producing  countr4es
could absorb such a  price decline and  still produce at present levels,
especially  if they reduced  their  export  tax on coffee. This option  appears
not  to be available  for  Cote  d'Ivoire. A 20% decline  in  prices,  for  example,
would either  force the government  to subsidize  the coffee  sector  or reduce
producer  prices. The first  option  cannot  be employed  for an extended  period
of time.  The second  option  would  reduce  Ivorian  coffee  production.  Thus,  if
the quota system were to be  lifted, C6te d'Ivoire  would face the high
probability  of  a  substantial  reduction in  its coffee export prices and
quantitites  for  several  years  after  the  suspension  of the  quotas.
i/  If,  on the  other  hand,  demand  were  to increase  at a  high  rate,  the  global
quotas  are  also  likely  to  be increased  at  a high  rate.  In  this  case  real
world  prices  would  need  to  be raised  to encourage  larger  world  production,
especially  if there  is  no productivity  increase.- 27 -
48.  If the export  quota  regime  continues,  C8te d'Ivoire  should  aim at
producing  about  300,000  tons  of coffee  for  the  next  5  to 10 years. This  would
enable  it to fulfill  its  existing  and prospective  quotas,  even allowing  for
years  of bad  crops  when it would  draw  down its  stocks. However,  it should  be
noted  that  even  if  C6te  d'Ivoire  attains  this  level  of production,  real  export
revenue  from coffee  is likely  to be lower  than  in the  early  1980s  because  of
the  expected  lower  world  real  coffee  prices.
C.  World  Market  Prospects  for  Cocoa
49.  Large  plantings  of cocoa  were made in the late  1970s  in response  to
tie  high  world  prices. These  trees  are  now  coming  into  full  production.  Real
world  cocoa  prices  have fallen  to very low  levels  and  are  expected  to  be weak
until the early 1990s.  They should strengthen  towards  the late 1990s as
production  responds  to the  present  low prices. Because  C6te  d'Ivoire  is the
largest producer,  accounting  for about 30Z of world production  in recent
years,  world cocoa prices  depend critically  on what happens  there.  (C8te
d'Ivoire's  share in world cocoa production  is approximately  the same as
Brazil's  share  in  world  coffee  production  in  recent  years).
50.  This  large share creates a  serious obstacle to  C8te  d'lvoire
increasing  its  export  revenues  from  cocoa  as it is  not a "price-taker",  i.e.,
ceteris  paribus,  a 1Z increase  in cocoa  exports  by C8te  d'Ivoire  leads  to an
export  revenue  increase  of less than 1% because  the  world price falls.  As
shown  in  Annex  A, we estimate  that  world  cocoa  prices  decline  by 0.41%  if C6te
d'Ivoire  increases  its exports  by IZ.  Thus,  a 1% increase  in cocoa  exports- 28  -
translates  to  a 0.59Z  increase  in  export  revenues  for  C6te  d'Ivoire. From  the
export revenue point of view, it is equivalent  to the last 1X of export
quantity  earning  only  592  of the  world  price.
51.  The above calculation  may  be  optimistic  because it  assumes no
productivity  increase  or currency  devaluation  by other  producing  countries.
In other  words,  if other  major  producing  countries  cope  with lower  US dollar
cucua  prices  by  Qurreiu;y  devaluatwuu,  p[xu4uuLivi!Ly  ius  m  ur  VedUQtluora  ita
export taxes, the last 1  of export  quantity  would earn an even smaller
percentage  of the world price  than 592.  If there is no reduction  in cocoa
production  in other  countries,  Ivorian  marginal  export  revenue  will be about
zero, that is, export  revenue  would not increase  through  an export  quantity
increase. If cocoa  investment  is evaluated  in these  terms,  alternative  crops
such  as  natural  rubber  or  oil  palm  may  become  more  attractive.- 29 -
VI  SOME  SINULATIOC  REWSULTS  FROM  THE COPPKE  AND  COCOA  NODELS
52.  The  supply  models  for  coffee  and  cocoa  can  be used  to simulate  future
production  of the two commodities  under  various  scenarios  about pricing  and
subsidy  policies. The  results  are  presented  in terms  of export  quantities  and
revenues  and  impact on government  and CSSPPA revenues.  All prices and
revenues  are  in  1987  constant  terms.
A.  Base  Case  Projections
53.  Before evaluating various policies using  the  model, base  case
projections  are  made.  The  assumptions  made in  the  Base  Runs  are:
(a)  Producer prices will  be  held  at  present levels in
constant  terms  through  2000;
(b)  C.i.f.  unit  export  values  will be the  projections  by the
World  Bank  of the ICCO  Indicator  Price  for  cocoa  and the
ICO robusta  coffee  price.  However,  for  cocoa,  changes  in
Ivorian  production  is assumed  to affect  world  prices  in
the  way  described  in  Annex  A;
(c) Domestic  marketing and  transportation  and  overseas
transportation  costs  are  assumed  to be at the  same  level
in the future  as those  given  in the "Differentials"  for
the  1987/88  season;- 30  -
(d) The stumping  subsidy  program  is assumed  to continue  at
the  rate  of 13,000  ha per  year;
(e) The exchange  rate of CPAF vis-a-vis  the US dollar is
assumed  to stay at the recent  rate of 290 CFAF to one
dollar;
(f) All  coffee  and  cocoa  produced  is  assumed  to be exported.
(g)  To  account for  diminishing land  availability, the
elasticity  of response  of new plantings  to increases  in
prices  is  assumed  to decline  by 2I  p.a.  from  1988.
54.  Simulation  results  for  the Base  Runs in terms  of some  key  variables
are  given  in  Tables  9 and  10.  Some  important  features  of the  results  include:
(a) Huge CSSPPA  and government  deficits  are projected  to be
incurred  from cocoa while some surpluser  are expected
from  coffee. The  CSSPPA  is  likely  to incur  deficits  from
cocoa  of about  CFAF 100  billion  every  year from  1988 to
1998.  Covernment  deficits  are  likely  to be between  CFAF
20 and 55 billion  annually  between  1988 and 1996.  The
deficits  are projected  to decline  in the  late 1990s  when
world  cocoa  prices  are  expected  to  strengthen.TABLE  9:  FESULTS  OF BASE  RUNS  FOR  C0COA,  1908-2000
cost  to  /a
CSSPPA  on  mvewnu*  From  tNt  Govermnnt
Year  Production  c.l.f.  Basis  World  Price  Export  Tax  CSSPPA  iBalance  BElance  Export  Revenue
-('000  T)-  -(CFAFAg)--  (tlStkg)  (CFAFAg)  (Billion  OFAFI  (Billion  CFAF)  (BillIon  CFAF)  (million  USS)  (Billion  CFAF)
99"  651.00  691.40  l80,00  521.00  65.41  -111.13  -45.7,  1,003.19  290.93
1969  676.00  691.40  176,00  512.00  67.92  -121,42  -53.X1  1,020.81  296.04
1990  701.00  691.40  179,00  519.00  70.43  -120.86  -50.4!,  1,075.96  312.03
1993  726.00  691.40  161.00  526.00  72.95  -120.02  -47.07  1,132.19  328.34
1992  749.00  69l.40  184.00  534.00  75.24  -117.99  -42.75  1,187.78  34.46
1993  772.00  691.40  187,.00  541.0D  77.60  -115.90  -38.31  1,244.90  361.02
1994  793.00  691.40  189,,00  550.00  79.71  -112.53  -32.825  1,301.25  377.36
1995  806.00  691.40  193,00  560.00  e0.99  -105.60  -24.61  1,352.44  392.21
1996  820.00  691.40  197.00  571.00  82.42  -9.94  -16.52  1,405.67  407.64
1997  832.00  691.40  201.00  583.00  03.59  -90.54  -6.94  1,459.48  423.25
199i  845.00  691,40  205,00  594.00  84.68  42.29  2.59  1,515.15  439.39
199  852.00  691.40  209.00  607.00  85.66  -71.89  13.7'  1,567.60  454.60
2000  861.00  691.40  214.00  620.00  66.51  -61.50  25.01  1,621.33  470.19
/a  Includes  export  tax  o  CFAF  100.5k  sad non-orwketing and transportation  cost of  CFAF  190.9/kg.
Source:  IECOt.TABLE  10:  RESULTS  Cf  FSE  MRUNS FOR  COFEE;  1966-2000
Cost to  /a
CSSPPA  on  Favenue  From  Not Government /b
TOW  Production  c.1.1.  Basis  Iorld  Price  Export Tax  CSSPPA  Balance  Balance  Export  Revenue
-('000  T)-  -(CFAFAg)-  1tS/hg)  (CAF/Ag)  (BillIon  CfAF)  (Billon  CFAF)  (Billion  CFAF)  (MI llon  tS1)  (BillIon  CFAF)
Coffee
1988  239.00  707.90  240.00  696.00  23.79  -2.82  19.89  516.31  149.73
1969  237.00  707.90  250.00  725.00  23.56  4.01  26.49  534.76  155.08
1990  234.00  707.90  254.00  736.60  23.26  6.64  28.83  537.27  155.81
1991  220.00  707.90  2!O.00  74.20  21.91  8.7g  29.62  514.78  149.29
192  211.00  707.90  262.00  759.80  20.96  10.83  30.73  501.13  145.33
1993  204.00  707.90  266.00  771.40  20.25  12.79  31.96  491.83  142.63
1994  197.00  707.90  270.00  7.00  19.51  4.58  33.02  481.75  139.71
1995  890.00  707.90  278.00  785.90  18.89  14.66  32.46  468.11  135.75
1996  886.00  707.90  272.00  788.88  18.41  14.82  32.16  458.24  132.89
1997  182.00  707.90  273.00  791.70  17.99  15.00  31.92  449.58  130.38
8996  177.00  707.90  274.00  794.60  17.58  15.17  31.67  441.01  127.89
1999  173.00  707.90  275.00  797.50  17.10  5.24  31.26  430.53  124.86
200o  167.00  707.90  275.00  797.50  16.53  14.74  30.19  416.39  120.75
/a  Includes export tax  of  CFAF  100.5/kg  n  non-mwkting  and transportation  cost  of  CfAF  230.4/kg.
/b  Includes CfAF  1.0  billion  for  the  staWing  program.
Source:  IECCt.- 33  -
(b)  Cocoa  production  is  expected  to  continue  to increase  at a
rapid  rate  to  reach  806,000  tons  by 1995  and  861,000  tons
by 2000.  Coffee  production  is projected  to decline  to
190,000  tons  by 1995  and  to 167,000  tons  by 2000.
(c) Real cocoa  export  revenue  is projected  to increase  from
US$1,003  million  in 1988  to US$1,352  million  in 1995  and
to US$1,621  million  in  2000.  Real coffee  export  revenue
is expected  to decline  from US$516  million in 1988 to
US$468  million  in 1995  and  to  US$416  million  in 2000.
55.  The base runs show that if the  present  pricing  policy  and exchange
rate level  are maintained,  the cocoa sector  will become  a serious  financial
problem  for C6te d'Ivoire. This can  be easily  seen from  Table 11 where the
details  are  presented  for  1988.
Table  11:  PROJECTED  BALANCE  SHEET  FOR  COCOA  FOR  1988
World  c.i.f.  Price  (US$/kg)  1.80
Exchange  Rate (CFAF/US$)  290.00
World  c.i.f.  Price  (CFAF/kg)  522.00
Producer  Price  (CFAF/kg)  400.00
Domestic  Marketing  and  Transportation  Costs  (CFAF/kg)  117.20
Freight  and  Insurance  (CFAF/kg)  73.70
Export  Tax (CFAF/kg)  100.50
Cost  to  CSSPPA  (CFAF/kg)  a/  691.40
Cost  to  Government  (CFAF/kg)  590.90
a/  Cost to  CSSPPA is given here because, although it  is a  government
parastatal  organization,  its financial  status  has  important  impact on
purchases  of coffee  and  cocoa  for  farmers.
Source: IECCM-34  -
56.  If present  policies  are continued,  the projected  accumulated  CSSPPA
deficit  between  1988  and  1997  is  CFAF  1,115  billion  (or  US$3.84  billion). The
corresponding  figure  for the  government  deficit  is CFAF 359 billion  (US$1.24
billion).  Thus, continuation  of the present  policies implies  drainage  of
government  revenues  into  the cocoa  sector  when diversification  to coffee  and
other  crops is desirable. From the figures  in Table 11 it can be estimated
that to balance  the CSSPPA's  cost  with the export  unit value,  the producer
price would have to  be lowered *rom 400 CFAF/kg to 230.6 CFAFIkg.  The
producer  price  to balance  the  cost to the  government  would  be 331.1  CFAF/kg.
Alternatively,  the  currency  would  have to be devalued  to 529.8  CFAF  to one  US
dollar (by 32%) to balance  the CSSPPA  cost.  The devaluation  necessary  to
balance  the  government  cost  would  be 13%.
B.  Costs  and  Effects  of Coffee  Sector  Policies
57.  As  discussed  in  previous  sections,  the  Government  of C6te  d'Ivoire
intends  to use subsidy  programs  invelving  stumping  and replanting  to increase
coffee  production.  The stumping  program  has been incorporated  into the  model.
It is  assumed  that  stumping  increases  yield  on the  average  by 300  kg/ha. When
exported,  this  incremental  yield  would  earn  US$720  or  CFAF  208,800  per  hectare
in terms  of 1988  prices.  However,  this  program  causes  a negative  cash  flow  for
the  CSSPPA  and the  government.  Calculated  from  Table  10,  one  kg of coffee  will
bring  on the  average  CFAF  65,4  to the  CSSPPA  and CPAF  165.4  to the  government
per  year  for  the  period  1989-2000.  The  corresponding  figures  for  a  hectare  #re
CFAF  19,620  and CFAF 49,620. However,  the  current  stumping  program  pays the
farmer  CFAF 60,000  per  ha.  Thus,  this program  will cause  a net government- 35  -
deficit  of CFAF 34.6/kg  for incremental  coffee  production. If the program
succeeds in making growers stump 18,000 ha as assumed in the base run
simulation,  the  accumulated  stumped  area  will  stabilize  at 90,000  ha (assuming
that  after  5  years  trees  need  stumping  again),  increasing  production  by 27,000
tons. The cost  of the  subsidy  program  would  be CFAP  1.08  billion  per  year.
58.  Under consideration  is a  subsidy  program  for replanting  of coffee
trees. Simulation  results  with  20,000  ha/year  of replanting  are  also  given  in
Table  12.  Under  this  scenario,  coffee  production  is higher  by 28,000  tons  by
1995  and by 56,000  tons  by 2000  compared  with the  Base  Run.  The  rather  small
differences  compared  with the Base Run result  from the assumption  that new
plantings  which  would  have taken  place  anyway  would  be replaced  by 20,000  ha
of  replanting  under  the  program. About  15,000  ha of new plantings  were made
in recent  years. The program's  net effect,  therefore,  is 5,000 ha of new
plantings.  Until there is research  done on the replanting  response to
incentives,  we can  only  make  an  estimate  of the  response  to the  subsidy.
59.  The  suggested replanting program seems  to have  some problems,
including  the following:  (i) as in the case of the stumping  program,  this
program  provides  subsidies  only  for  replanting.  The  program  does  not  generate
improved  husbandry  as would  an increase  in  the  producer  price. Thus  the  yield
oh replanted  trees  might be small;  (ii) the program  will incur  substantial
costs  to the government. In the  near future  the government  is projected  to
ehrn approximately  CFAF 117.6/kg  from coffee.  If the replanting  program
succeeds  in increasing  yield  per ha by 700  kg, the  government  will make CFAF
82,320/ha.  If the cash subsidy amount is CFAF 200,000/ha  (the proposed-36  -
sub  idy), the program  will lead to a deficit  of some CFAF 117,680/ha  or a
total of CFAF 2.35 billion  per year;  (iii)  apart from the above costs,
SATMACI  staff  and  seedling  nurseries  would  have to  be increased.  No estimates
are  made  of these  costs,  but  they  could  be substantial.
60.  The results  of a l0Z increase  in the real  producer  price  for  coffee
is  also shown  in  Table  12.  This simulation  does  not  include  the  stumping  and
replanting  programs.  Comparison  of the results  in Table 12 shows  that the
stumping  program  would be the  most effective  in terms  of cost/benefit  ratio
and the producer  price increase  the least  effective.  Results in Table 12
should  be interpreted  with caution,  however,  as the effects  of a  producer
price  increase  are  most probably  underestimated.  As stated  in Section  II,  if
adequate  price  incentives  are given  for coffee,  growers  are likely  to stump
and replant  without  cash subsidies.  Better  organization  of the extension
services  may  add  to this  price  reaponse.
61.  The reeults  of the simulations  show that Ivorian  coffee  production
may decline  rather  sharply  if current  policies  are continued. This decline
would  be due  mainly  to the  pricing  policy  which  favors  cocoa  over  coffee.Table  12: COSTS  AND  EFFECTS  OF COFFEE  POLICIES;  1988-2000
Without  With  Replanting  cf
any  Subsidy  With  Stumping  20,000  ha/year  at
Program  and  no  of 18,000  ha/year  CFAF  20D,000/h  (Including
Price  Change  at  CFAF  60,000/ha  (18,000  ha/year  Stumping)  Producer  Price  Increase  of 10%
Year  Production  Productlon Fiscal  Cost  Production  Fiscal  Cost  Production  Fiscal  Cost
-('000  T)-  -(OtiO  T)-  (billion  CFAF)  -('000  T)-  (billion  CFAF)  -('000 T)-  (billion  CFAF)
1988  233.00  239.00  1.08  239.00  4.00  239.00  9.01
1989  226.00  237.00  +t;O  237.00  4.00  231.00  8.71
1990  218.00  234.00  1.08  235.00  4.00  222.00  8.37
1991  199.00  220.00  1.08  225.00  4.00  203.00  7.65
992  184.00  211.00  1.08  222.00  4.00  189.00  7.13
1993  177.00  204.00  1.08  223.00  4.00  183.00  6.90
1994  170.00  197.00  1.08  221.00  4.00  178.00  6.71
1995  164.00  190.00  1.08  218.00  4.00  175.00  6.60
1996  '59.00  186.00  1.08  218.00  4.00  173.00  6.52
1997  155.00  --  - 182.00  1.08  222.00  4.00  172.00  6.48
1998  151.00  177.00  1.08  224.00  4.00  170.00  6.41
1999  146.00  173.00  1.08  225.00  4.00  167.00  6.30
2000  141.00  167.00  1.08  223.00  4.00  164.00  6.18
TOTAL  2,322.00  2,615.00  14.01  2,932.00  52.00  2,466.00  92.97




(CFAF/kg)  46.8  164.0  645,6
Source:  IEC04.- 38  -
C.  Simulations  on Recommended  Changes  in  Coffee  and  Cocoa  Producer  Prices
62.  The simulation  results  above ehow clearly  that the continuation  of
present  policies  are likely  to lead  to huge government  deficits  arising  from
subsidization  of  the  cocoa sector and  a  substantial  decline in  coffee
production.  Various solutions  to these problems  may be considered,  i.e.,
devaluation  of the  currency,  the provision  of incentives  for coffee  growing
(increasing  prices  and/or  subsidies)  and the  reduction  of the producer  price
for cocoa.  Since devaluation  is an unlikely  option for the near term a
simulation  run  was  made  on changes  in  the  pricing  policy.
63.  As discussed  in sub-section  A  above  (see  also  Table  11),  to eliminate
the government  deficit from cocoa,  cocoa producer  prices  would have to Pe
considerably  reduced. This is politically  difficult. The maximum  reduction
in cocoa  producer  prices  likely  to be possible  in the  near term is probably
about  lOX. As for  coffee,  the  subsidy  programs  will  be much  more effective  if
producer  prices are directly increased;  this will provide incentives  for
farmers  to grow coffee,  which will give better  results for the replanting
program. To illustrate  the  impact  of such  effects,  a simulation  run  was  made
under  the  following  assumptions:- 39  -
(a)  From 1988 cocoa producer prices are  reduced by  10% and  coffee
producer  prices  are  increased  by 10%.
(b)  Stumping  of coffee  trees  is  carried  out  over 30,000  ha a year  during
the  period  1988-2000.
(c) With improved  price  incentives,  the  replanting  program  is assumed  to
add  12,000  ha of  coffee  plantings  during  the  period  1988-2000.
64.  The results  under the above  assumptions  are shown in Tables  13 and
14.  Under  this  set  of policies,  coffee  production  is much  higher  than  in the
Base  Run--38X  more in 1995  and 72%  more in 2000.  Cocoa  production  is reduced
by 4% in 1995 and by 9% in 2000 compared  with the Base  Run.  However,  even
with a  10% reduction in the cocoa producer price, the cocoa sector is
projected  to involve  large deficits  for the CSSPPA  and the government  for
several  years.
65.  To  illustrate  the trade-off  between  coffee and cocoa production,
Table  15 summarizes  some  of the  key statistics  from  Tables  9 and  13.  Table  15
shows that CSSPPA  and government  balances  and export  revenues  from the two
commodities  improve substantially  under the recommended  policies,  although
there  may  be some  reduction  in  the  gross  revenue  of growers.Table 13:  RESULTS  OF  PECWENDED  POLICY  RUN  FOR  CFFEE: 1968-2000
Cost to
CSSWA  on  Revenue  From  Not Governmnt
Year  Production.  c.l.f.  Basis  World (c.l.t.)  Price  Export Tax  CSSPPA  Baancen-  Balance  Export  Refenue
-(CO)O  T)-  -(OFAFdkg)-  (US9/Ag)  (CFAFAg)  (Billion  CAF)  (Billion  CAF)  (Billion  CFAF)  (Million  USS)  (Billion  CAF)
Coffee
1968  249.5  745.6  250.0  725.0  24.9  -5.1  16.8  564.3  163.7
1969  250.8  745.6  250.0  725.0  25.0  -5.1  16.9  567.3  164.5
1990  252.7  745.6  254.0  736.6  25.2  -2.3  19.9  501.5  168.6
1991  247.0  745.6  258.0  748.2  24.6  0.6  22.2  577.9  167.6
1992  250.4  745.6  262.0  759.8  24.9  3.5  25.5  595.6  172.8
1993  256.1  745.6  266.0  771.4  25.5  6.5  29.1  619.5  179.7
1994  259.7  745.6  270.0  763.0  25.9  9.6  32.5  636.5  185.2
1995  262.6  745.6  271.0  765.9  26.2  10.5  33.6  646.3  166.0
1996  266.0  745.6  m.0  766.8  26.7  11.5  35.2  664.1  192.6
1997  276.0  745.6  273.0  791.7  27.5  12.6  37.1  686.9  199.2
1996  262.1  745.6  274.0  794.6  26.1  13.7  35.8  704.6  204.4
1999  266.1  745.6  275.0  797.5  26.5  14.7  40.2  717.7  208.1
2000  266.0  745.6  275.0  797.5  28.7  14.8  40.5  722.3  209.5
Source:  IECCI.Tablh 14:  iESULTS  OF RECINENDED  POLICY  FM FOR  COCOA:  I16-2000
Cost to
CSSPPA  on  Revenue  Frao  Net Governent
Tre  Production  c.l.f.  ails  World c.i.f.  Price  Export  Tax  CSSPPA  Baleacs  BaI  anc  Export  Revenue
-(|0000 T)-  -(CFAFAg)-  (UStIfiq)  (CFAFAq)  (BillIco  CFAF)  (Billo  CFAF)  (BtIllon  CFAF)  (Mil11lion US$)  (Bill1ion CFAF)
Corn
196  634.3  651.4  161.4  525.9  63.7  -79.59  -15.t4  969.1  286.9
1919  6!3.6  651.4  176.3  517.1  66.2  -6.43  -22.24  1,007.1  292.0
1990  663.0  651.4  100.9  524.6  68.6  -6.62  -17.96  1,061.6  307.9
1991  706.7  651.4  13.5  532.1  71.0  -642o  -13.26  1,!17.2  324.0
1992  727.4  651.4  It6.4  540.6  73.1  40.59  -7.48  1,171.2  339.6
1993  747.5  651.4  189.4  549.2  75,1  -76.36  -1.24  1,225.7  355.5
1994  763.7  651.4  192.6  559.1  76.7  -70.50  6.2  1,278.2  370.7
1995  770.3  651.4  197.3  572.0  77.4  -61.12  16.3  1,323.6  383.9
1996  776.6  651.4  201.6  565.1  78.0  -51.48  26.6  1,369.5  397.2
1997  779.5  651.4  206.9  599.9  78.3  -40.13  36.2  1,414.5  410.2
196  73.1  651.4  211.9  614.5  78.7  -28.'6  49.6  1,460.4  423.5
1999  761.6  651.4  217.5  630.s  78.6  -16.07  62.5  1,501.9  435.6
2000  7i1.3  651.4  223.1  646.9  76.5  -3.50  75.0  1,544.3  447.6
Snre:  IEC>.- 42  -
Table  15:  COPARISON  OF THE  BASE  RUN  AND  THE  RECOMENDED  POLICY  RUN: 1988-2000
Growers'  Revenue  CSSPPA  BaIance  Government Balance  Export  Revenue
Year  Base Run  RPR  /a  Base Run  RPR  Bas  Run  RPR  Base Run  RPR
- …---------  ------------  - ((BIIIon  CFAF)--(Million  USS)-
1988  350.4  331.8  -107.08  -74.49  -16.96  0.9  1,543.2  1,553.5
1989  359.5  341.1  -117.41  -93.55  -27.01  -5.37  1,555.6  1,574.3
1990  368.4  350.7  -114.22  -88.67  -21.60  1.9  1,613.2  1,643.3
1991  373.4  356.8  -111.23  -83.64  -17.45  9.0  1,647.0  1,695.0
1992  379.0  365.7  -107.16  -77.06  -12.02  16.0  1,688.9  1,766.9
1993  385.7  375.3  -103.11  -69.81  -6.34  27.8  1,736.7  1,845.2
1994  391.3  382.6  -97.95  -60.88  0.2  38.7  1,783.0  1,916.7
1995  394.1  386.2  -90.94  -50.63  7.9  49.9  1,820.6  1,971.9
1996  398.0  390.7  -84.12  -40.01  15.6  61.7  1,863.9  2,033.6
1997  401.1  395.1  -75.53  -27.52  25.0  75.3  1,909.1  2,101.3
1998  404.7  398.9  -67.12  -15.16  34.3  88.6  1,956.2  2,165.2
1999  406.0  400.1  -56.65  -1.35  45.0  102.7  1,998.1  2,219.6
2000  407.3  400.7  -46.76  11.3  55.2  115.5  2,037.7  2,266.6
/a  Recomends Poli cy  Run.
Source: IECCM,  COte  d'tvoire  Coffee  and  Cocoa  Models.- 43  -
ANNEX  A
Effects  of Ivorian  Production  on World  Prices
66.  As Ivorian  coffee  export  quantities  are  not expected  to exceed  5% of
total world coffee  exports,  it was assumed  that Cote d'Ivoire  is a "price
taker"  in this  market. However,  such  an assumption  is  not  realistic  for  cocoa
as C6te d'Ivoire's  world  export  share  is about  301.  In the  model used here
world cocoa  prices  are based on those projected  by the World Bank.  These
projected prices are  based  on  the World  Bank's projection of  Ivorian
production.  Thus, if Ivorian policies  are changed and different Ivorian
production  levels from those projected follow, the projected  world price
levels  should  also change.  Evaluation  of all the simultaneous  changes  in
world cocoa prices, world stock levels  and production  by other producing
countries  resulting  from changes  in Ivorian  cocoa  production  would require  a
full-fledged  world  model. Incorporation  of simulation  and  results  from  such  a
large  model would have made this study  much more extensive.  Therefore,  a
simpler  relationship  between Ivorian  production  level  and world prices  has
been  incorporated.
67.  Inputs required  for this part of the model are the World Bank's
projected  Ivorian production,  C6te d'Ivoire's  world market share and the
Bank's  projected  world prices.  Given these inputs  and assuming  the world
price  elasticity  of demand  to be -0.3 and the  price  elasticity  of supply  by
the  rest-of-world  to be 0.4 (this  should  be lower  in the  short-run  and  higher
in the long-run),  world prices  as a function  of Ivorian  production  can be
defined  as:-44  -
WP  =  wpb  . {1-{100  . ICMS  . {ICPD  - ICPDbI/ICPDbI/{E 4 +  {1-ICMS}  EI
Where:  WP  =  World  cocoa  prices
Wpb  =  World  cocoa  prices  projected  by the  Bank  consistent
with  ICPDb
ICMS =  Ivorian  world  market  share  of cocoa  production
ICPD =  Ivorian  cocoa  production  from  the  model
ICPDb  =  Ivorian  cocoa  production  projected  by the  Bank
Ed  =  World  price  elasticity  of demand
ES  =  Price  elasticity  of supply  by  other  producing
countries
68.  In the above equation,  the percentage  difference  between ICPD and
ICPDb  is  first  calculated.  Multiplying  this  value  by the  Ivorian  world  market
share  gives  the percentage  difference  between  ICPD and ICPDb  in world total
production. The impact  of this  percentage  difference  in world  production  on
world price can be derived by dividing  it by the sum of the world price
elasticity  of demand  and the price elasticity  of supply  by other producing
countries.
69.  Substituting  0.3 for ICMS,  0.3 for Ed and 0.6 for Es, the equation
above  shows  that  a 1% increase  in  the Ivorian  production  reduces  world  prices
by 0.41Z.  This implies  that  the last  1  of exports  increases  export  revenue
by 0.59Z  (i.e.,  1.0  - (1.01  *  0.9959)).ANNEX  B
Assumptions Mode for  Construction  of  Vintage  Capital  Matrices
(a) The  yield  curve  assumed  Is  basod  on  data  in  the  "Agricultural  Sector  Review"  with  some  modification  prompted  by
discussions  with  SAThACI  extension  officers  and IRMC  agronomists.
Years  After  Planting  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  II  12  13  14  15-30
Traditional  Coffee  0  0  0  100  250  350  350  300  210  210  210  210  210  210  210  1
Improved  Coftee  0  0  100  350  700  900  600  400  500  750  600  500  400  450  450  VI
Years  After  Planting  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9-20  21-30  Over  30
Traditional  Cocoa  0  0  0  0  150  250  330  400  450  300  200
Hybrid  Cocoa  0  0  150  200  300  500  600  700  750  650  550- 46 -
(b)  The death  rates  of trees  refers  to the  percentage  of trees  that  die
over time. This information  was obtained  from  SATMACI  extension  officers  and
IRCC  agronomists.
Years  After  Planting  0-10  11-20  21-30  31-40  Over  40
………  (Z---------------(X  p.a.)-------------------
Traditional  coffee  0  1.4  2.6  3.6  4.0
Improved  coffee  0  2.0  6.6  12.9  -
Traditional  cocoa  0  1.0  3.0  7.0  -
Hybrid  Cocoa  0  1.0  3.0  7.0  -
(c)  Because  new plantings  data are available  only from 1960 for
coffee and  1969 for cocoa, the  vintage capital matrices calculate the
production  potential  of trees  planted  since  that  time. Therefore,  assumptions
must be made about  the production  potential  of trees  planted  in prior  years.
The production  potential  of old trees  can be estimated  by substracting  the
production  potential  of new  trees from total production.  However, this
difference  suffers  from  fluctuations  caused  by weather  and other  factors. To
eliminate  the  fluctuations,  an exponential  curve  was  fitted. This  calculation
assumes  a constant  percentage  decline  in the  production  capacity  of old  trees
with time.  The rate  of decline  so estimated  is then  applied  for the period
over which  data are available. For future  periods,  higher  rates  of decline
are assumed  as the production  capacity  of old trees  suffers  both from tree
death  and  from  yield  decline.- 47  -
Assumed  rates  of decline  in  production  cap. ¾ies of old  trees  are  as
follows:
Years  Up to 1973  1973-84  1985-1994  1995-2000
---------------------------- …(  p.a.)--------------------------
Cocoa  0  a/  3.8  8.0  20.0
Years  Up to 1970  1971-1980  1981-1990  1990-2000
-……(2------------------X  p.a.)…----------------------------
Coffee  0  a/  7.0  8.0  35.0
a/  The  production  capacitj  of  old  trees  is  defined  as the  difference  between
actual  production  and the  production  potential  of new  trees.
(d)  In 1983 bush fires killed  large  numbers  of coffee  and cocoa
trees. According  to the  agricultural  surveys,  about  8Z of the  standing  trees
died.  This  death  rate  was  applied  to trees  of all  ages.
(e)  the  effects  of stumping  (recepage)  are  taken  into  account  in the
model.  It is assumed  that  each  hectare  of stumped  trees  adds  300  kg to  total
coffee  production  capacity.PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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